| (cont.)
II.
The Ethical Argument: The Logic of Linkage
As I read Fr. McCormick's
proposal, both principles would become proportional
judgments. My experience in addressing the nuclear
question leads me to conclude that such an interpretation
will weaken the moral strength of the ethic of war.
In assessing the strategy of deterrence, having two
distinct criteria of moral analysis provided the bishops
with a perspective on the policy debate which was
different from what a totally proportionalist view
would have offered. Because of my experience with
this specific moral dilemma of deterrence and because
I find the prohibition against the intentional killing
of the innocent a crucial element across the spectrum
of the consistent ethic, I find myself not persuaded
by Fr. McCormick's recommendation, even though I appreciate
the care with which he reviewed my lectures. I know
adherence to the absolute prohibition creates very
complex and difficult choices, not least in deterrence
theory, but testing the absolute prohibition across
the spectrum of life leads me to reaffirm it rather
than reduce its status.
A very different objection to the consistent ethic
arose—primarily from persons active in the right-to-life
movement—immediately after the Gannon Lecture. The
critique continues to this day. The objection is raised
against the way I called for relating our defense
of innocent life to support for social policies and
programs designed to respond to the needs of the poor.
The passage of the Gannon Lecture which attracted
the most criticism read this way:
If
one contends, as we do, that the right of every
fetus to be born should be protected by civil law
and supported by civil consensus, then our moral,
political and economic responsibilities do not stop
at the moment of birth. Those who defend the right
to life of the weakest among us must be equally
visible in support of the quality of life of the
powerless among us: the old and the young, the hungry
and the homeless, the undocumented immigrant and
the unemployed worker. Such a quality of life posture
translates into specific political and economic
positions on tax policy, employment generation,
welfare policy, nutrition and feeding programs,
and health care. Consistency means we cannot have
it both ways: We cannot urge a compassionate society
and vigorous public policy to protect the rights
of the unborn and then argue that compassion and
significant public programs on behalf of the needy
undermine the moral fiber of the society or are
beyond the proper scope of governmental responsibility.
Reviewing those words in light of the criticisms of the
last two years, I still find what I said to be morally
correct and, if anything, politically more necessary
to say than it was two years ago. In the first half
of the 1980s we have seen many of the programs designed
to meet basic needs of poor people systematically
cut. Perhaps the prototypical example is what is happening
to children—precisely those who first evoke our right-to-life
defense. In the second draft of the pastoral letter
on the economy the bishops graphically describe the
situation of children in our country:
Today one in every four American children under the
age of 6 and one in every two black children under
6 are poor. The number of children in poverty rose
by 4 million over the decade between 1973-1983, with
the result that there are now more poor children in
the United States than at any time since 1965.
In a recent book of far-reaching significance, Senator
Patrick Moynihan has made the point that children
are the most vulnerable group in our society.
In the face of this evidence it is precisely the function
of a consistent ethic to gather a constituency which
stands against those social forces legitimating the
taking of life birth, and stands against other social
forces legitimating policies which erode the dignity
of life after birth by leaving children vulnerable
to hunger, inadequately housing, and insufficient
health care.
The criticism of my Gannon Lecture was twofold: that
it confused two different moral issues and that it
expected everyone to do everything. I have responded
to this critique previously, but I wish to expand
upon my response. Surely we can all agree that the
taking of human life in abortion is not the same as
failing to protect human dignity against hunger. But
having made that distinction, let us not fail to make
the point that both are moral issues requiring a response
of the Catholic community and of our society as a
whole.
The logic of a consistent ethic is to press the moral
meaning of both issues. The consequences of a consistent
ethic is to bring under review the position of every
group in the Church which sees the moral meaning in
one place but not the other. The ethic cuts two ways,
not one: It challenges prolife groups, and it challenges
justice and peace groups. The meaning of a consistent
ethic is to say in the Catholic community that our
moral tradition calls us beyond the split so evident
in the wider society between moral witness to life
before and after birth.
Does this mean that everyone must do everything? No!
There are limits of time energy and competency. There
is a shape to every individual vocation. People must
specialize, groups must focus their energies. The
consistent ethic does not deny this.
But it does say something to the Church: It calls
us to a wider witness to life than we sometimes manifest
in our separate activities. The consistent ethic challenges
bishops to shape a comprehensive social agenda. It
challenges priests and religious to teach the Catholic
tradition with the breadth it deserves. And it challenges
Catholics as citizens to go beyond the divided witness
to life which is too much the pattern of politics
and culture in our society. Responding to this multiple
challenge requires consideration of the pubic consequences
of the consistent ethic.
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